Blockchain Selfish Mining

Proof of Work (PoW) Blockchains implement a form of State Machine Replication (SMR). Unlike classical SMR protocols, they are open, i.e., anyone can join the system, and the system incentivizes participants, called miners, to follow the protocol. Therefore, unlike classical SMR protocols, reasoning about blockchain security relies not only on bounding the number of malicious participants. One should crucially ask whether miners are indeed incentivized to follow the prescribed protocol.... [Read More]

Consensus Lower Bounds via Uncommitted Configurations

In this series of three posts, we discuss two of the most important consensus lower bounds: Lamport, Fischer [1982]: any protocol solving consensus in the synchronous model that is resilient to $t$ crash failures must have an execution with at least $t+1$ rounds. Fischer, Lynch, and Patterson [1983, 1985]: any protocol solving consensus in the asynchronous model that is resilient to even one crash failure must have an infinite execution.... [Read More]

Security proof for Nakamoto Consensus

Bitcoin’s underlying consensus protocol, now known as Nakamoto consensus, is an extremely simple and elegant solution to the Byzantine consensus problem. One may expect this simple protocol to come with a simple security proof. But that turns out not to be the case. The Bitcoin white paper did not provide a proof. Several academic papers (e.g. Garay, Kiayias, Leonardos, and Pass, Seeman, shelat and Kiffer, Rajaraman, shelat) later presented rigorous... [Read More]